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DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY DEVISED OR CONVEYED TO ONE
AND HIS CHILDREN.
When property is devised or conveyed to one and his children
there arises a question as to how such property shall be distributed
among the intended recipients. In such cases it is generally held
that the parent takes no larger portion than does each child, and
that they share in the property as joint tenants or as tenants in com-
mon.' Kentucky does not accord with this rule. In this state the court
has held almost uniformly that in such a transfer of property by will
or by deed a life estate is given to the parent with remainder in fee
to the children.2 Through a long line of decisions the Kentucky
court, whether rightly or not, has failed to draw any distinction
between those cases involving wills and those embracing deeds, con-
sidering them together and citing them interchangeably.3
"Devise: Moore v. Ennis, 10 Del. Ch. 170, 87 Atl. 1009 (1913);
McCord v. Whitehead, 98 Ga. 381, 35 S. E. 767 (1896); 3%oore v. Gary,
149 Ind. 51, 48 N. E. 630 (1897); Noble v Teeple, 58 Kan. 398, 49 Pac.
598 (1897); Hampton v. Wheeler, 99 N. C. 222, 6 S B. 236 (1898);
Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 100 Va. 552, 42 S. E. 306 (1902).
Conveyance: Moore v. Lee, 105 Ala. 435, 17 So. 15 (1894); Bran-
ham v. Day, 75 Miss. 923, 23 So. 578 (1898); Cullens v. Cullens, 161
N. C. 344, 77 S. B. 228 (1913); Fales v Curriet, 55 N. H. 392 (1875);
Porter v. Lancaster, 91 S. C. 300, 74 S. D. 374 (1911).
2 By will: Carr v. Estill, 55 Ky. (16 B Mon.) 309 (1855); Frank v.
Unz, 91 Ky. 621, 16 S. W. 712 (1891); Mefford v. Dougherty, 89 Ky.
58, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 157, 11 S. W. 716 (1899); Brand v. Rodes, 17 Ky. L.
Rep. 97, 30 S. W. 597 (1895); Adams v. Adams, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 655,
47 S. W. 335 (1898); Kuhn v. Kuhn, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 112, 68 S. W. 16
(1902); Sims v. Skinner, 118 Ky. 573, 81 S. W. 703 (1904); Smith v.
Smith, 119 Ky. 899, 85 S. W. 169 (1905); Brock v. Brock, 168 Ky. 847,
183 S. W. 213 (1916); Lacey v. Lacey, 170 Ky. 166, 185 S. W. 495
(1916); Selman v. Livers, 229 Ky. 90, 16 S. W. (2d) 800 (1929). See:
Rice v. Klette, 149 Ky. 787, 149 S. W. 1019 (1912).
By deed: Webb v. Holmes, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 404 (1843); Foster
v. Shreve, 69 Ky. 519 (1869); Davis v. Hardin, 80 Ky. 672, 1 Ky. L.
Rep. 165 (1880); Smith v. Upton, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 27, 13 S. W. 721
(1890); Bodine v. Arthur, 91 Ky. 53, 14 S. W. 904 (1890); Fletcher v.
Tyler, 92 Ky. 145, 17 S. W. 282 (1891); Brumley v. Brumley, 28 Ky. L.
Rep. 231, 89 S. W. 182 (1905); Hall v. Wright, 121 Ky. 16, 87 S. W.
1129 (1905).
2 Brand v. Rodes, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 97, 30 S. W. 597 (1895). But see
L. R. A. 1917B 50, n. I (the primary objective of the interpretation
of a will is to accomplish the intent of the testator if it can be done
without a perversion of the plain meaning of the words he used, and
the intention of the devisor is not to be considered. However, in con-
struing a deed the intention of both parties must be given equal
weight, and change may be made only by joint action).
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The earliest case of importance in Kentucky which bears upon
the instant problem is Webb v. Holmes, decided in 1843.4 Here was
involved the construction of a deed conveying to the grantor's daughter
a certain "dower inu lands for the benefit of her and his (her hus-
band's) children". The court found that although the grantor's daugh-
ter was named in the deed as the sole grantee, the grantor actually
intended that the daughter's children-both those in esse and those
later to be born--should take an interest under the conveyance. Since
by the common law those not parties to a deed may not take under
it a iresent interest, though they may take in fturo, the intent of the
parties could not have been effectuated by making the daughter and
her children tenants in common,5 and the court held that a life estate
should go to the grantee, with remainder to be shared by her children,
both those in esse and those later born.6
After this decision came several cases applying its doctrines.,
Some enunciated a contra theory, but these were either expressly
overruled in subsequent decisions, or explained away by the court,'
and no important departure from or addition to Webb v. Holmes was
presented until Davis v. HardinP was decided in 1880. This differed
from the Webb case in that the conveyance was not to the daughter of
the grantor, but to his wife and children, and it was held that the
intent of the grantor could not have been to make joint tenants of
the grantees because in the event of the grantor's death his bounty
might pass to a stranger,0 and in the event of a divorce and remar-
442 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 404 (1843). Turner v. Patterson, 35 Ky.
(5 Dana) 292 (1837), was decided prior to Webb v. Holmes, but is
of no particular value in this discussion because the court there held
that the context of the will clearly imported that a life estate was to
be given to the wife with remainder to the children.
Would not a shifting use have achieved the same result? Thus
the estate would open to include after-born children. The property
already held would shift to provide for the newly-born children, who
would receive their proportionate share as a result of the use which
would also spring to them as soon as they come into being.
6See Hall v. Wright, 121 Ky. 16, 87 S. W. 1129 (1905), which
approves this doctrine as a means of allowing after-born children to
take a share in their grandfather's estate, when such was clearly the
intention of the testator.
Carr v. Estill, 65 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 309 (1855); Righter v. For-
rester, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 278 (1867); Foster v. Shreve, 69 Ky. 519
(1869); Koenig v. Kraft, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 945, 7 S. W. 622 (1888).
3 Gill v. Logan, 50 Ky. (11 B. Mon.) 231 (1850) (referred to in
Davis v. Hardin, 80 Ky. 672, 674, 1 Ky. L. Rep. 165 (1880); Cessna v.
Cessna, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 516 (1868) (explained as not departing from
the general Kentucky rule, in Hall v. Wright, surra, n. 7, p. 29);
Powell v. Powell, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 620 (1869) (referred to as being
erroneous in Davis v. Hardin, supra, p. 675).
180 Ky. 672, 1 Ky. L. Rep. 165 (1880).
"oThe reasoning of the court as used in Davis v. Hardin, supra,
n. 10, at p. 673, is to the effect that a father making provision for his
child and that child's children may well be supposed to intend that
they, take jointly, since they are all of his blood and the "natural
objects of his bounty". However, in a conveyance from a husband to
his wife and children, if it were held that they take jointly, the wife
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riage of the grantor's wife, the property might pass to such stranger
even as against the grantor himself. Consequently, the wife was given
a life estate with remainder to the children. The holding was based
primarily on the relationship between the grantor and the grantee,
and the court intimated (p. 673) that had the conveyance been to the
grantor's child and that child's children, it might be presumed that
the grantor desired a joint tenancy. Thus the court in considering
Webb v. Holmes cast a doubt upon its future adherence to that theory.
This language questioning the soundness of Webb v. Holmes was
referred to and approved in Smith v. Upton," though here again it
was but dictum, since the case actually involved a deed to "wife and
children", and was decided upon the precisely analogous Davis v.
Hardin. The way was thus open for an actual repudiation of the Webb
v. Holmes doctrine, at least in cases other than devises to the grantor's
wife and children. But when the matter was actually presented to
the court in Bodine v. Arthur, involving a deed from the grantor to
a stranger and his children, any question concerning the Kentucky
rule was resolved when the doctrine of the Webb case was specifically
reaffirmed. 13 Thus, unquestionably, the rule of the Kentucky court
was that in the case of a will or conveyance giving property to one
and his children, the parent should have a life estate and the children
a remainder in fee when the intent was not shown to be otherwise.
In Adams v. Adams" the court advanced another ground of sup-
port for what may be termed the established Kentucky rule. There
a will was involved which devised property to the testator's daughter
and her children, and it was held that the daughter was entitled to
a life estate in the property. The court considered the possibilities
of a joint estate in the parent and children, but said that it was not
to be supposed that the testator meant to give such an estate that the
quantity of interest that each takes will remain uncertain and shift at
the birth of each afterborn child, thus diminishing the provision made
for the son or daughter.
would receive an interest which, upon her remarriage and death,
would go to her second husband-a stranger to the devisor and one
whom he would not have wished to share in the proceeds of his prop-
erty. The reasoning seems specious in view of the fact that this identi-
cal result is possible whenever there is a devise in fee to the wife, or
whenever she receives personal property under a will and the argu-
ment set forth here is not regarded as being of any value in such cases.
"12 Ky. L. Rep. 27, 29, 13 S. W. 721 (1890) (here was involved
a deed from the grantor to his wife and children, so the actual ques-
tion was not passed upon); see Koenig v. Kraft, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 945,
947, 7 S. W. 622 (1888). Of. Bullock v. Caldwell, 81 Ky. 566, 5 Ky. L.
Rep. 576 (1884) (where the plain language of the deed showed an
intention to make the parent and her children joint tenants).
91 Ky. 53, 14 S. W. 904 (1890).
"'The fact that the conveyance here was to a stranger makes the
rejection of the dictum of Davis v. Hardin, supra n. 9, even more
forceful, since the court in that case intimated that the only possible
reason for finding a joint tenancy was the relationship of husband
and wife.
"120 Ky. L. Rep. 655, 47 S. W. 335 (1898).
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Since these adjudications the Kentucky holding has not been
altered. A number of cases have been decided,5 the majority of which
involve wills devising property to the testator's wife and children, but
no contradictory or inconsistent view has been taken.
As has been stated, the generally accepted view is opposed to
the Kentucky holding, and in such cases the wife and children take
as joint tenants in the property.18 This doctrine, in regard to both
wills and deeds, probably is based on Wild's Case,'7 which has been
accepted as standing for two propositions:
1. If there is an immediate devise to A and his children and A
has no children, the will is construed as creating an estate tall
in A.$
2. If A has children, A and his children take as joint tenants for
life.2"
The interpretation of Wild's Case is based upon the idea that the
testator intended to transfer a present interest (i. e., "an immediate
devise") and the courts attempt to effectuate such a presumed inten-
tion. But does it necessarily follow from language analogous to "to A
and his children" that the testator intended to transfer a present
interest? Mr. Simes in his work on Future Interests does not agree
with such a construction. He says:
"And, while the language, if taken literally, indicates an im-
mediate gift, it seems that in most cases the testator's wishes
would be best effectuated by construing the limitations as creat-
ing a life estate in A with remainder in his children.",'
Several factors may be considered in supporting this view. First,
in a devise from a husband to his wife and their children or in the case
of a devise from a father to his child and that child's children (the
testator's grandchildren), the relationship of the testator, in the one
case to the wife and in the other to the child, is closer than the
affinity with the children or grandchildren respectively, and it seems
reasonable that he would wish to make provision for them before the
others, but not necessarily to their exclusion. Second, where the devise
is to the testator's wife and children, particular regard would naturally
be had to providing for the wife in her old age. A life estate only
would better insure this objective because there would be much less
danger of the wife's losing her share, and she would be better pro-
vided for throughout her life. Third, a testator devising property to
his child and that child's children would naturally wish to make pro-
'sSee cases cited in note 2, supra.
16 See cases cited in note 1, supra.
17 6 Coke 16b, 77 Eng. Reprint 277 (1599). That these decisions
are founded on Wild's Case, see L. R. A. 1917B 50, n. 4, et seq.
213 Jarman on Wills (7th ed., 3 vols. 1930) 1864.
"
9Jarman, op. cit. supra n. 18, p. 1869.
'02 'Simes, Law of Future Interests (3 vols. 1936) 202. In this
connection see: In re Jones, L. R. (1910) 1 Ch. (Eng.) 167; Faribault
v. Taylor, 58 N. C. 219 (1859); Noe v. Miller, 31 N. J. Eq. 234 (1879).
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vision for them all, and not merely for those in being to the exclusion
of those later to be born.
For these reasons, it is believed that it is not correct to make
the simple statement, as interpreted from Wild's Case, that the testa-
tor intended to pass a present interest, but that it is more in accord
with his probable meaning to say that he intended that both the parent
and children should receive a present interest, but that the enjoyment
In possession as regards the children should arise in futuro.
But there is a very conclusive reason why Wild's Case should not
be followed by the Kentucky court. It is evident from that decision
that the first rule therein was adopted for the purpose of giving effect
to the presumed intention of the testator that afterborn children
should share in the estate, when there was no other way in which that
could be accomplished, and in order to carry this intent, it was held
that a fee tail was passed by the will. However, since 1796 the fee
tail has been abolished in Kentucky and replaced by a fee simple.2
Accordingly, if Wild's Case were followed, the parent would take a fee
simple, with the result that the very purpose which motivated the
court in Wild's Case (I. e., a desire to effectuate as nearly as possible
the testator's intention) would not be achieved. The children would
get nothing. Hence the court was obliged to find some other method
of distributing the property which would as nearly as possible
accomplish the testator's objective. This it has done by giving a life
estate to the parent with remainder to his children.2
Referring again to Wild's Case, it is seen that a wide distinction
is drawn between propositions one and two as to whether or not the
children are then in esse. Mr. Simes criticizes this distinction:
"... the wide difference in the solution suggested in Wild's
Case where there are and where there are not children seems
artificial in the extreme. Either the testator would intend the
children of A to take concurrently with him (A) or in succession
after him .. .and the time at which they are born would be of
no effect ... "2
Since the question of after-born children will not be presented in
a devise to the testator's wife and children, such an issue will arise
only when the devise is to the testator's child and that child's children.
It is certainly reasonable to suppose, in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, that the testator intended that all of his grandchildren
should share in the bequest, and not merely those in esse. It is believed
that Simes criticism is sound.2'
2 Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (1936), sec. 2343. Act approved
Dec. 19, 1796. 1 Litt. Laws 567, sec. 10.
- See Turner v. Ivie, 5 Heisk (Tenn.) 222 (1871) (in view of the
abolition of estates tail in Tennessee the rule of Wild's Case should
no longer be recognized as a rule of testamentary construction). To
like effect see Carr v. Estill, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 309 (1855).
3Simes, op. cit. supra n. 20, p. 203.2 1Cases which accord with this view are: Carr v. Estill, 55 Ky.
(16 B. Mon.) 309 (1855); Righter v. Forrester, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 278
(1867); Hall v. Wright, 121 Ky. 16, 81 S. W. 1129 (1905); Chambers
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The Kentucky court apparently has seen the reasons against
attempting to effectuate the testator's intention in this jurisdiction by
an application of the rule of Wild's Case and has consistently held
that a life estate should go to the parent with remainder to his chil-
dren. In situations analogous to the first proposition in that case
this is logical, for the children are not in being and the fee tail of
ild's Case cannot be effectuated in this state. The supposed intention
of the testator is secured under the Kentucky holding, while it could
not be achieved by an application of the principles of Wild's Case.
In situations similar to proposition two, the court's holdings have
been consistent with its decisions under the first rule. If Simes is
correct in his criticism of the distinction between situations in which
there are children and those in which there are none in esse at the
time of the testator's death, then that is another reason for refusing
to follow Wild's Case. But what is more important is that in Ken-
tucky a fee simple is presumed where there is any doubt as to the
quantity of the estate to be taken, thus giving A and his children a
joint tenancy in fee simple instead of a joint tenancy for life as in
Wild's Case. The court has rejected this alternative as not being in
accord with the testator's intention, because he would never have
meant to give in such a manner that the exact estate which each
would hold would be so uncertain. Thus the Kentucky court's interpre-
tation of situations similar to proposition two of Wild's Case is no less
logical than the one there embodied.
B. H. H-a Aw
GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION IN KENTUCKY.
The Court of Appeals has often stated that suspension and dis-
barment are not means of punishment, but are designed to protect the
bar and the court and to promote the administration of justice.1 How-
v. Union Trust Co., 235 Pa. 610, 84 Atl. 512 (1912) (stating that the
second proposition in Wild's Case is not law in Pa.); Keown's Estate,
238 Pa. 343, 86 Ati. 270 (1913); Scruggs v. Mayberry, 135 Tenn.
(8 Thomp.) 586, 188 S. W. 207 (1916).
z See cases cited, supra, note 2.
' Bakerv. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 592 (1874): "it would be unjust
to the profession .... and a disregard of public welfare to permit an
attorney who has forfeited his right to public confidence to continue
(to practice)"; Chreste v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 311, 198 S. W. 929,
933 (1917): "It is recognized that . . . (disbarment) - . . is not in its
nature a punishment . . . but is inflicted with a view of purifying and
maintaining the high standard for integrity so essential to the office of
attorney at law"; Accord: Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93,
176 S. W. 948, 955 (1915): "The purpose of disbarment is not to punish
the attorney, but to protect the court and the administration of justice
. . Commonwealth v. Porter, 242 Ky. 561, 46 S. W. (2d) 1096, 1097
(1932): "The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is not to punish
the attorney but to protect the court in the administration of justice."
For general treatment of the subject of this note see: Warvelle, Legal
Ethics (19.02) sees. 65, 68, 69, 73, 74; Cohen, The Law: Business or
Profession? (1924), pp. 1-23; Bolts, Ethics for Success at the Bar
(1928) pp. 17-37; Brown, Lawyers and the Promotion of Justice
(1938) pp. 210-215.
